Gas models and three difficult objectives

Competition, security of supply and sustainability are at the core of EU energy policy. The Commission argues that making the European gas market more competitive (completing the internal gas market) will be instrumental in the pursuit of these objectives. We examine the question through the eyes of existing models of the European gas market. Can model tell us anything on this problem? Do they confirm or infirm the analysis of the Commission appearing in fundamental documents such the Green Paper, the Sector Inquiry or the new legislation package? We argue that results of existing models contradict a fundamental finding (paragraph 77) of the Sector Inquiry. We further elaborate on the basis of the economic assumption underlying the models, that changing the assumptions implicitly contained in paragraph 77 cast doubts on a large part of the reasoning justifying the completion of the internal gas market. We also explain that models could help arriving at a better definition of the relevant market, which is so important in the reasoning of the Commission. Last we also find model results that question the effectiveness of ownership unbundling. As to security of supply, we explain that models can also contribute to assess the value of additional infrastructure in the context of security of supply, but this potential seems largely untapped. Last we note that sustainability has not yet penetrated models of gas markets. We conclude by suggesting other area of immediate concern, possibly of higher technical difficulty, that modellers could address in future research.

Degree of coordination in market-coupling and counter-trading

Cross-border trade remains a contentious issue in the restructuring of the European electricity market. Difficulties stem from the lack of a common market design, the separation between energy and transmission markets and the insufficient coordination between Transmission System Operators (TSOs). This paper analyzes the cross-border trade problem through a set of models that represent different degrees of coordination both between the energy and transmission markets and among national TSOs.We first present the optimal organisation, not implemented in Europe, where energy and transmission are integrated according to the nodal price paradigm and Power Exchanges (PXs) and TSOs are integrated. This is our reference case. We then move to a more realistic representation of the European electricity market based on the so-called market-coupling design where energy and transmission are operated separately by PXs and TSOs. When considering different degrees of coordination of the national TSOs’ activities, we unexpectedly find that some arrangements are more efficient than the lack of coordination might suggest. Specifically we find that even without a formal coordination of the TSOs’ counter-trading operations, non discriminatory access to common counter-trading resources for all TSOs may lead to a partial implicit coordination of these TSOs. In other words, an internal market of counter-trading resources partially substitutes the lack of integration of the TSOs. While a full access to counter-trading resources is a weaker requirement than the horizontal integration of the TSO, it is still quite demanding. We show that quantitative limitations to the access of these resources decrease the efficiency of counter-trading. The paper supposes price taking agents and hence leaves aside the incentive to game the system induced by zonal systems.Cross-Border Energy Trade, Market-Coupling, Counter-Trading, Coordination, Generalized Nash Equilibrium

Market coupling and the organization of counter-trading: separating energy and transmission again?

The horizontal integration of the energy market and the organization of transmission services remain two open issues in the restructured European electricity sector. The coupling of the French, Belgian and Dutch electricity markets (the trilateral market) in November 2006 was a real success that the inclusion of Germany to the trilateral market should soon prolong. But the extension of market coupling whether in Central Western Europe or in other European regions encounters several difficulties and the future remains far from clear. The highly meshed grid of continental Europe complicates things and it is now sometimes recognized that the penetration of wind will further exacerbate these difficulties. The nodal system could go a long way towards solving these problems, but its implementation is not yet foreseen in the EU. This paper analyzes versions of market coupling that differ by the organization of counter- trading. While underplayed in current discussions, counter-trading will become a key element of market coupling as its geographic coverage expands and wind penetration develops. We consider a stylized six node example found in the literature and simulate market coupling for different assumptions of zonal decomposition and coordination of TSOs. We show that these assumptions matter: market coupling can be quite vulnerable to the particular situation on hand; counter-trading can work well or completely fail depending on the case and it is not clear beforehand what will prevail. Our analysis relies on standard economic notions such as social welfare, Nash and Generalized Nash equilibrium. But the use of these notions is probably novel. We also simplify matters by assuming away strategic behaviour. The nodal organization is the reference first best scenario: different zonal decompositions and degrees of coordinations are then studied with respect to this first best solution.D52, D58, Q40

Evaluating the impact of average cost based contracts on the industrial sector in the European emission trading scheme

The inception of the Emission Trading System in Europe (EU-ETS) has made power price more expensive. This affects the competitiveness of electricity intensive industrial consumers and may force them to leave Europe. Taking up of a proposal of the industrial sector, we explore the possible application of special contracts, based on the average cost pricing system, which would mitigate the impact of CO2 cost on their electricity price. The model supposes fixed generation capacities. A companion paper treats the case with capacity expansion. We first consider a reference model representing a perfectly competitive market where all consumers (households and industries) are price-takers and buy electricity at the short-run marginal cost. We then change the market design assuming that large industrial consumers pay power either at a single or at a nodal average cost price. The analysis of these problems is conducted with simulation models applied to the Northwestern European market. The equilibrium models developed are implemented in the GAMS environment.average cost pricing, complementarity conditions, EU-ETS, Northwestern Europe market.

Stochastic equilibrium models for generation capacity expansion

Capacity expansion models in the power sector were among the first applications of operations research to the industry. The models lost some of their appeal at the inception of restructuring even though they still offer a lot of possibilities and are in many respect irreplaceable provided they are adapted to the new environment. We introduce stochastic equilibrium versions of these models that we believe provide a relevant context for looking at the current very risky market where the power industry invests and operates. We then take up different questions raised by the new environment. Some are due to developments of the industry like demand side management: an optimization framework has difficulties accommodating them but the more general equilibrium paradigm offers additional possibilities. We then look at the insertion of risk related investment practices that developed with the new environment and may not be easy to accommodate in an optimization context. Specifically we consider the use of plant specific discount rates that we derive by including stochastic discount rates in the equilibrium model. Linear discount factors only price systematic risk. We therefore complete the discussion by inserting different risk functions (for different agents) in order to account for additional unpriced idiosyncratic risk in investments. These different models can be cast in a single mathematical representation but they do not have the same mathematical properties. We illustrate the impact of these phenomena on a small but realistic example.capacity adequacy, risk functions, stochastic equilibrium models, stochastic discount factors

Energy only, capacity market and security of supply. A stochastic equilibrium analysis

Former generation capacity expansion models were formulated as optimization problems. These included a reliability criterion and hence guaranteed security of supply. The situation is different in restructured markets where investments need to be incentivised by the margin resulting from electricity sales after accounting for fuel costs. The situation is further complicated by the payments and charges on the carbon market. We formulate an equilibrium model of the electricity sector with both investments and operations. Electricity prices are set at the fuel cost of the last operating unit when there is no curtailment, and at some regulated price cap when there is curtailment. There is a CO2 market and different policies for allocating allowances. Todays situation is quite risky for investors. Fuel prices are more volatile than ever; the total amount of CO2 allowances and the allocation method will only be known after investments has been decided. The equilibrium model is thus one under uncertainty. Agents can be risk neutral or risk averse. We model risk aversion through a CVaR of the net margin of the industry. The CVaR induces a risk neutral probability according to which investors value their plants. The model is formulated as a complementarity problem (including the CVaR valuation of investment). An illustration is provided on a small problem that captures the essence of today electricity world: a choice restricted to coal and gas, a peaky load curve because of wind penetration, uncertain fuel prices and an evolving carbon market (EU-ETS). We show that we might have problem of security of supply if we do not implement a capacity market.capacity adequacy, risk functions, stochastic equilibrium models

Average power contracts can mitigate carbon leakage

The progressive relocation of part of the Energy Intensive Industries (EIIs) out of Europe is one of the possible consequences of the combination of emission charges and higher electricity prices entailed by the EU-Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). In order to mitigate this effect, EIIs have asked for special power contracts whereby they would be supplied from dedicated power capacities at average (capacity, fuel, transmission and emission allowance) costs. We model this situation on a prototype power system calibrated on four countries of Central Western Europe. In order to capture the main feature of EIIs' demand, we separate the consumer market in two segments: EIIs and the rest. EIIs buy electricity at average cost price while the rest pays marginal cost. We consider two different types of EIIs' contractual arrangements: a single region wide and zonal average cost prices. We also analyze the cases where generators only rely on existing capacities or can invest in new ones. We find that these average cost contracts can indeed partially mitigate the incentive to relocate activities but with quite diverse regional impacts depending on different national power policies. Models are formulated as a non-monotone complementarity problems with endogenous energy, transmission and allowance prices and are implemented in GAMS.average cost based contracts, carbon leakage, complementarity conditions, EU-ETS.

Multi-assets real options

Real options present a wide topic in investment litterature nowadays. However, despite big advances in the single asset investment pricing, the theory is miser of informations about problems involving more than one asset. We show in this paper that using dynamic programming, one can find an analytic trigger for a three assets simple exchange problem. Although we get a forward investment rule, one can not find the precise option value ex ante but only an average value. The precise option value depends on the first exit time from the continuation region which is stochastic. This is a quite intuitive effect of the course of dimensionality of the problem. Valuating a single asset project gives a single condition for the optimal decision rule. The same holds for the simple exchange problem with two assets since the value of the project just depends on the price over cost ratio. In a three assets problem, as the project don't depend anymore of a single state variable, one can't region.real options, dynamic programming, price and cost uncertainty

Equilibrium models for the carbon leakage problem

Carbon leakage in this pape ris the phenomenon whereby Electricity Intensive Industries subject to harsh environmental standards move their activity or part of it to more environmentally lenient regions. Carbon leakage has been mentioned as a possible outcome of the EU Emission Trading Scheme. Different studies are underway to assess the reality of the phenomenon and to devise policies to mitigate its possible impact. One remedy, proposed by the Energy Intensive Industries is to combine free emission allowances with a pricing of electricity whereby energy emissions and transmission costs are bundled and sold on an average cost basis. The paper attempts to model this proposal. We cast the problem in a spatial model of the power sector where generators can develop new capacities, the transmission system is organized on a flowgate basis, emission allowances are auctioned, except possibly for industries, and traded. The consumer market is decomposed in two segments. Industries purchase electricity according to some form of average cost price, the rest of the market is supplied at marginal cost. These equilibrium models are non convex. We present the models and discuss their properties. Companion papers report policy implications.carbon leakage, emission trading scheme, electricity, energy policies, equilibrum, complementarity.

Liquidity risks on power exchanges

Financial derivatives are important hedging tool for asset’s manager. Electricity is by its very nature the most volatile commodity, which creates big incentive to share the risk among the market participants through financial contracts. But, even if volume of derivatives contracts traded on Power Exchanges has been growing since the beginning of the restructuring of the sector, electricity markets continue to be considerably less liquid than other commodities. This paper tries to quantify the effect of this insufficient liquidity on power exchange, by introducing a pricing equilibrium model for power derivatives where agents can not hedge up to their desired level. Mathematically, the problem is a two stage stochastic Generalized Nash Equilibrium and its solution is not unique. Computing a large panel of solutions, we show how the risk premium and player’s profit are affected by the illiquidity.illiquidity, electricity, power exchange, artitrage, generalized Nash Equilibrium, equilibrium based model, coherent risk valuation